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The European Union is about to experience its largest increase in 
population since its creation in the 1950s with the accession of 10 
new countries. This will increase the population by 20% and GDP 
by 9%.  The institutional implications of this enlargement have 
already delayed agreement on a new constitution for EU. But there 
are also important implications for labour and capital markets. It 
provides a major challenge for inflexible labour markets since free 
capital movements will accelerate the movements of production to 
areas of the EU where labour costs are lower. 
The question is whether the conditions are in place for the Acceding
Countries to move smoothly towards economic and monetary 
union. The integration of ten new members requires that the internal 
fiscal and monetary framework is in place to allow convergence 
under the Maastricht Treaty. Economic and institutional structures 
need also to be flexible in order to respond best to the opportunities 
opened up by accession. But it also requires that the existing 
European Union is flexible and able to respond to the challenges 
coming from more competition in labour, capital and product 
markets. This is why the process of labour and product market 
liberalisation takes on an even greater urgency. 
 
__________________________ 
Economic Prospects for the Acceding Countries 
On the eve of EU membership, the Acceding Countries are showing 
continued improvement in their economic outlook despite the 
muted recovery in the rest of Europe. Following a difficult two 
years in 2001 and 2002 and the relatively weak performance in the 
first half of last year, growth gained momentum across the region, 
fueled by stronger growth in exports, moderate expansion in 
investment activity and stable growth in consumer spending. The 
first signs of a global recovery, in particular the reports of a modest 
growth rebound in the largest EU economies in the second half of 
2003, bodes well for short- to medium-term growth in the Acceding 
Countries. Rising exports are likely to strengthen the gains in 
industrial production, further improve the financial situation of 
local companies, and improve the external balances that in some 
Acceding Countries have deteriorated over the last few years. 
Growth in the region will be mostly supported by a rebound in 
investment activity and steady expansion in private consumption. 
Another factor that will provide a boost to domestic demand will be 
wider access to EU regional and structural funds for the 
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Performance on inflation has been more mixed since the summer 
months of 2003. Grain harvests suffered from drought conditions across 
the continent, putting pressure on prices of key food products, with 
prices rising throughout the reminder of last year. Furthermore, two of 
the Acceding Countries, Slovakia and Hungary, in order to make them 
compliant with EU requirements, embarked upon a major adjustment to 
VAT and excise tax rates. While core inflation remained under control, 
the impact of sharp increases in prices could have a longer-lasting effect 
on inflationary expectations, providing for a much more challenging 
environment for the monetary authorities. 
 
__________________________ 
Forecasting Acceding Countries 
The forecasts reported above are mostly judgemental, since the 
implementation of formal methods is difficult, because the transition 
period to a market based economy only provides short spans of reliable 
data over time. One way of overcoming this problem is to exploit the 
data on a wide variety of different aspects of the economy. In this
approach, the short time span of the data is augmented by a large 
number of macroeconomic variables in the longitudinal dimension and 
factors are extracted from the resulting large data set and used for 
forecasting. Simple time series models provide a valid alternative 
forecasting tool, because of their parsimonious specification and good 
performance in similar contexts. 
We compare the usefulness of the two approaches to forecasting by 
means of simulation experiments and by using data for five of the 
Acceding Countries, namely the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Slovakia and Slovenia. We also evaluate the role of Euro area 
information for forecasting, and the usefulness of techniques such as 
intercept corrections and second differencing which make the forecasts
robust to changes in the structure of the economy. We find that factor 
models work well in general, techniques for making the forecasts robust 
to structural breaks are useful in a few cases, while Euro area 
information appears to be virtually irrelevant for forecasting in this 
context. The latter finding is due to the decreased synchronisation of the 
Acceding Countries with the Euro area because of the convergence 
process, as discussed in the EFN Autumn 2003 Report. 
 
__________________________ 
Current Account Sustainability in Acceding Countries 
Another potential problem for accession countries relates to the 
sustainability of their current accounts, with the episodes of exchange 
rate and balance of payment crises during the 90s highlighting the 
danger of having too large current account deficits. 
Most accession countries show large, and in some cases widening, 
deficits originated both by a surge in investment and by expansionary 
fiscal policies.  Moreover, after the entry into the EU these countries 
will try to join the monetary union, and the transition to the single 
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Using standard accounting methods, and given reasonable 
assumptions on real growth and interest rates, most of the countries 
under analysis have sustainable external balances, but the contribution 
of FDI flows is crucial to keep the external debt under control. 
Projections obtained using a simple econometric model point out to a 
widening of these imbalances in the medium term. 
From a policy perspective, three issues stand out. First, economic 
authorities will have to design fiscal policies so that a higher domestic 
savings will offset to a large extent the expected surge in investment. 
Second, microeconomic policies aimed at guaranteeing steady 
inflows of FDI and at building a sound financial system capable of 
managing these high inflows should have a top position in the agenda. 
Finally, the exchange rate regimes prior to the full adoption of the 
euro should allow the economy enough flexibility to cope with large 
external imbalances. 
__________________________ 
Monetary Transmission in Acceding Countries 
The monetary transmission mechanism describes the channels 
through which monetary policy decisions are transmitted to the 
economy and affect policy objectives. The analysis of monetary 
transmission in the Acceding Countries is especially relevant because 
it is clear that the goal after they are part of the European Union is to 
join the Monetary Union. In fact, as more central banks in Acceding 
Countries move towards inflation control, good knowledge of the 
transmission mechanism in the economy becomes crucial for 
implementing appropriate policies. Moreover, in the context of the 
Monetary Union, “country” differences in monetary transmission 
could be translated on business cycle asymmetries that could have 
clear effects on convergence. 
One aspect that should be taken into account when analysing the 
transmission of monetary policy in Acceding Countries is their 
different exchange rate systems (as the degree of monetary 
independence is clearly linked to the exchange rate system and also to 
the degree of control of capital flows). Those Acceding Countries that 
are relying on fixed exchange rates, particularly hard pegs like 
currency boards, have tied hands in monetary policy. On the other 
hand, those Acceding Countries which opted for floating exchange 
rate regimes particularly free floaters with inflation targeting, retain 
independence in their monetary policies, while those relying on 
intermediate regimes are somewhere in between. 
The empirical analysis leads us to the conclusion that monetary policy 
has been effective in controlling inflation and stabilising output in 
nearly all the Acceding Countries we have examined, although the 
results should be taken with cautious, because of the short time period 
considered. 
It is worth mentioning the cases of the Slovak Republic and Slovenia, 
where there is clear evidence of an exchange rate transmission 
channel, but the interest rate channel remains blocked. In this case, 
given the critical importance of joining the Euro Area as soon as 
possible, the monetary authorities should shift to a balanced conduct 




































The  Banking System in Acceding Countries 
Another aspect we focus on in this Report is the scope for the 
banking structures in the Acceding Countries to contribute to orderly 
financial markets and to aid the efficient allocation of capital.  
All of the Acceding Countries have already made dramatic strides in 
improving the stability and efficiency of their banking sectors as well 
as eliminating restrictions on capital flows. However, these processes 
are not complete and there is the need for further progress in 
increasing competition in the banking sector and more substantial 
flows of short-term capital, even though this may increase the risks 
of instability in the banking sectors of the individual Acceding
Countries.  
Extensive restructuring of the banks was required because of the 
substantial burden of non-performing loans that threatened their 
viability as financially independent institutions. These banks were 
therefore financially unviable as independent institutions without 
significant restructuring of their balance sheets. They lacked not only 
the financial capital, but also the human and physical capital that 
would be necessary to compete in a liberalized market for financial 
services. The privatisation of the banking systems in the transition 
economies of Central and Eastern Europe was aimed not only at 
attracting capital injections and increasing efficiency in the financial 
services sectors, but also at eliminating the inappropriate incentives 
to bank management that contributed to the burden of non-
performing loans inherited from the socialist era. In addition to the 
processes of restructuring and privatisation that were launched by the 
economic transition of the 1990s, increased competition in the 
financial services sectors has generally trimmed the number of banks 
after initial periods of expansion, through mergers or withdrawal of 
banking licenses. The growth of domestic credit has increased 
substantially in the past several years in most of the region as banks 
became more confident at assessing credit risks. The profitability of 
the banking system remains low by EU standards and may be further 
eroded by additional competition. 
Recent developments in the banking sectors of Poland and the Czech 
Republic and Romania who is due to enter the EU in the next wave, 
indicate significant achievements. There have been improvements in 
the efficiency and scope of their roles in financial intermediation 
through restructuring and privatization, the opening of the banking 
markets to foreign participation and the enhancement of bank 
regulation and supervision, both in principle and in practice. The 
Acceding Countries have been aided in this reform process by 
technical advice and resources from international financial 
institutions and the European Union. Most usefully, the process of 
harmonizing the national legislation and practice with the EU’s own 
banking directives has provided a critical road map for domestic 
contribute to prepare the financial sector for the ECB policy-operating 
environment, where monetary policy is implemented and transmitted 
primarily through interest rates, and only to a minor extent through 
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policymakers and legislators in preparing the bank sectors to cope 
with the stresses and opportunities of the post-transition and post-
accession economic and financial environment. We have also 
noted areas where additional progress is required if there is to be 
substantial certainty that these bank sectors will continue to 
promote financial stability, provide an improved financial 
intermediation function and help to drive robust economic 
growth. 
It is essential to  
• Strengthen the independence of supervisory agencies,  
• enforce avoidance of conflict of interest  
• and impose exposure limits, 
• encourage the principles of good corporate governance,  
• and improve standards for auditing. 
 
__________________________ 
Economic Prospects in the Euro Area 
 
Full and rapid integration of the ten new member states will be
served best by a vibrant and growing Euro Area. However 
economic performance has been particularly poor over the last 
three years with a sluggish recovery from the global downturn.
Output grew by only 0.4 % in 2003 and we expect this to improve 
in 2004 to only 1.4%, see Table 1, well short of areas elsewhere 
in the world economy. The structural changes necessary to 
achieve the objectives set out in the Lisbon Accord have been 
very slow to materialise. 
After the weak performance of the Euro area economy in the first 
two quarters of 2003 activity picked up in the second half of the 
year. This was mainly due to a rebound of exports. Although the 
Euro appreciated against the Dollar and, to a lesser extend, 
against other major currencies, exports profited from the revival 
of the world economy. Consumption nearly stagnated and 
investment still declined. The modest performance of the 
domestic economy led to a subdued import growth. 
The recovery of the world economy is now under way. 
Geopolitical tensions due to the Iraq war have eased, and the 
SARS disease no longer appears to threaten economic activity on 
a global scale. The ICT sector, three years after the end of the 
new economy bubble, seems finally to find promising new fields, 
in particular in consumer electronics. Monetary policy is very 
expansive with real short term interest rates now close to zero in 
the USA, in Japan and in the Euro area and there is no indication 
that they will be raised any time in the coming months. 
The centres of the recovery are the US and Asia. In the US 
growth has accelerated throughout the year 2003. The strong 







Figure 1 Quarterly GDP growth rates 
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substantial tax reductions has already set a strong upswing in the 
private sector, which is mainly driven by an increase in business 
investment. Although the upswing had no significant impact on 
employment so far, labour markets appear to be flexible enough 
to be finally able to profit in the near future. Therefore, the risk of 
an abrupt decline in consumption in the forecasting horizon is 
low. 
The second centre of economic growth is Asia: strong growth in 
China led to a spectacular expansion of imports of around 40%. 
Japan, after a decade of stagnation, appears to return to a growth 
path. This revival is not only driven by exports, but also by 
private investment. The expanding Asian demand for industrial 
inputs is a main cause for the quite high oil price and for the rise 
in many commodity prices since the autumn of 2003. 
The US, Japan, and the large countries of the European Union 
presently all run sizable public deficits. Fiscal consolidation will 
become a priority when the upswing is clearly under way at the 
end of 2004. This will contribute to a slightly lower evolution of 
the world economy in the year to come. World trade will expand 
around 8.5% in 2004 and 8.1% in 2005, after 4.2% in 2003. 
The Euro area lags behind the cyclical upswing of the world 
economy. The outlook will improve over the forecasting horizon, 
but the overall performance is expected to remain modest. GDP 
growth is forecasted at around 1.4% in 2004 and 2.0% in 2005. 
Although quite low, the expansion of output is higher than the 
growth rate of potential GDP: as the weak investment activity in 
the past hampers the current capital stock, potential output growth 
will declines over the near future. The output gap will narrow 
over the forecasting horizon, but it will be reduced only 
gradually. At the end of 2005, still a significant gap of 1.3% of 
potential GDP is predicted. Thus, no sizable inflationary pressure 
is expected from the demand side. The relative weak performance 
of the economy can be seen in the quarter-on-quarter GDP growth 
rates. From 2004.2 on, they are almost constant at the 0.5% level, 
see figure 1. Hence, an acceleration can hardly be detected. 
Although the global upswing will be reflected in a rebound of 
exports, the recent appreciation of the Euro will take its toll and 
will support import growth in 2004. Therefore, net exports will 
only slightly contribute to economic growth in 2004. Since import 
growth is expected to be slightly stronger than export growth in 
2005, their impact will even turn to be negative, see figure 2. 
Both private consumption and investment are expected to pick up 
gradually over the forecasting horizon. However, the dynamics 
remain weak, although the financing conditions are favourable: 
real interest rates are at low levels, and stock prices have been 
rising since the trough in Spring 2003. The recent slowdown after 
the terrorist attack of March 11 will be a transitory phenomenon. 
One factor explaining the modest path of investment are non-
optimistic sales prospects, as reflected by the evolution of the 
output gap. Since potential growth was above actual in the recent 
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downturn period, stocks are likely to be high. In addition, profit 
prospects of investors will improve only gradually. Due to a 
recovery of productivity, real unit labour costs are roughly 
constant in 2004, and in 2005 a significant decline of roughly 1 
percent is expected. However, the previous cumulative increase 
of this measure was almost about 2 percent over the 2001-2003 
period, see table 1. Hence, acceleration in investment is mainly to 
ensure competitiveness by adopting new technologies. Brighter 
profit prospects, further improvement of financing conditions, 
and better financial health of commercial banks will facilitate the 
development. 
Private consumption is expected to profit from the improved 
confidence of households. HICP price inflation in 2004 will be 
lower due to the appreciation of the Euro. This, however, will 
lead to lower wage inflation: wages move in line with prices and 
productivity, while the labour market situation plays only a minor 
role. Therefore real incomes will not benefit very much from the
appreciation. Moreover, labour market prospects will not 
conspicuously improve over the forecasting horizon, with 
unemployment remaining close to 9%. As GDP growth does not 
exceed productivity growth in 2005, employment will not 
Table 1 Economic outlook for the Euro area 
  2001 2002 2003 2004: 1st half 2004: annual 2005: annual














GDP 1.6 0.9 0.4 1.1 1.4 1.4 1.8 2.0 2.7
1.6 1.5 1.0
Potential Output 2.5 2.4 1.9 1.9 2.4 1.9 2.5 1.7 2.4
0.3 0.6 1.0
Private Consumption 1.8 0.1 1.0 0.8 1.3 1.1 1.5 1.7 2.4
-1.3 -0.7 1.1
Fixed Capital Formation -0.1 -2.9 -1.2 0.2 1.7 1.0 2.7 3.5 5.7
2.6 3.3 4.8
Exports 3.3 1.7 0.0 3.9 5.1 4.8 6.3 7.2 9.3
2.2 3.2 5.3
Imports 1.7 0.1 1.5 3.6 5.0 4.7 6.2 7.6 10.0
8.6 8.6 8.3
Unemployment Rate 8.0 8.4 8.8 8.8 9.0 8.9 9.1 8.8 9.2
1.2 0.9 0.9
HICP 2.3 2.2 2.1 1.7 2.2 1.8 2.7 1.9 2.9
Percentage change in the average level compared with the same period a year earlier, except for the unemployment rate which is expressed in 
levels. Point forecasts and 80% confidence bounds are taken from EFN forecasting model and based on 2000 stochastic simulations 
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significantly profit from the upswing. Furthermore, the increase 
in the labour force participation rate which was observed since 
1995 will come to a halt. 
Problems of financing the pay-as-you-go pension systems and 
public sector deficits in major Euro area countries will stay on 
the political agenda, and are further reasons for cautious 
consumption behaviour. Also, demand management by fiscal 
policy which appears to be effective in the US is not an option 
in the Euro area due to the comparatively weak position of 
public households in large member countries. 
The strong positive stimulus from world trade on exports is 
jeopardized by the increase in the effective exchange rate of the 
Euro. The main reason for this development appears to be the 
sceptical attitude of currency traders towards the sustainability 
of the large and widening current account deficit in the US. A 
weaker Dollar, it is argued, will help to reduce the deficit. 
Because the monetary authorities of important Asian countries 
have slowed the appreciation of their currencies, a weak Dollar 
will imply a strong Euro. 
Upon closer inspection, however, the Dollar pessimism does 
not rest on firm economic grounds. it is not the choice between 
products of different origins but the intertemporal decisions of 
US households, firms and the government to spend at present, 
that lead to large capital imports. The counterpart of these 
imports is the current account deficit. Therefore, a structural 
reduction of the deficit would only be caused by changes in 
intertemporal prices, i.e. interest rates, or by a change in the 
expectations about future incomes in the US. Such a change 
might be aided by a weaker Dollar, but that does not mean that 
the currency has to fall until the deficit has shrunk to some level 
considered as sustainable. According to the EFN forecast, the 
Dollar will be roughly stable around 1.20 Euro in 2004. Still, 
measured by purchasing power parities, the Euro appears to be 
overvalued relative to the Dollar. Therefore, we expect a 
depreciation of the Euro down to 1.14 for 2005. 
However, exchange rate forecasts are notoriously unreliable. 
Thus, a further rapid appreciation of the Euro is not to be 
considered as a totally unlikely event. If it happened, the ECB 
might very well come under public pressure to counteract by 
Japanese style intervention. But, since an exchange rate related 
monetary policy is in danger of being affected by the high 
degree of instability in the currency markets, the ECB should 
not depart from its strategic focus on internal stability. The best 
provision against the pressure from an appreciation would be to 
convince Asian monetary authorities of the merits of more 
flexible exchange rates. This would mean that the effects of the 
Dollar volatility were spread more evenly instead of falling 
predominantly on Euro area producers. 
An analysis of the economic situation of the European economy 
also needs a short term perspective based on qualitative and 
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quantitative indicators. The general economic sentiment 
indicator and the index of industrial production can be used for 
this purpose. This analysis is also useful because for the 
mentioned indicators observations till February 2004 are 
available. They show that a moderate recovery is in the way at 
the beginning of 2004, therefore at this moment no significant 
revisions of the GDP growth for 2004 and 2005 are expected 
when data for the first quarter of 2004 arrives. 
Finally, in the last six months inflation performed in line with 
our predictions. The forecast for the average annual rate in 
2004 and 2005 are 1.8% and 1.9%, respectively, and reflect 
slightly higher prices for oil and some industrial goods. 
 
Additional details on all the Chapters are available in a set of 
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play an increasingly 
important role in 
determining growth 
On the eve of their EU membership, the Acceding Countries 
are showing continued improvement in their economic 
outlook despite the timid recovery in the rest of Europe. 
Following a difficult two years in 2001 and 2002 and the 
relatively weak performance in the first half of last year, 
growth gained momentum across the region, fueled by 
stronger growth in exports, moderate expansion in investment 
activity and stable growth in consumer spending. Poland’s 
growth continued to accelerate in each of the consecutive 
quarters, reaching an impressive 4.7% year on year (y/y) in 
the fourth quarter. In the Czech Republic, the second half of 
last year was also characterized by much stronger expansion, 
in the 3.4-3.5% range, that should provide basis for further 
growth in 2004 and beyond (see Table 1.1 and Annex 1 for 
details). Despite serious problems with gaining traction 
throughout the year, mostly due to struggling export-oriented 
sectors, the Hungarian economy is also reporting a visible 
upturn, with GDP growing by 3.5% y/y in the final quarter of 
last year, an improvement from the sluggish 2.6% expansion 
in January-June last year. The Baltic economies continued to 
break all growth records last year, with GDP growth ranging 
from 7.4% in Latvia to 8.3% in Lithuania. Growth rates in 
Estonia moderated to 4.4%, as domestic demand, mostly 
private consumption was weaker than estimated. The three 
small economies of Slovenia, Malta and Cyprus, reported 
moderate growth rates for 2003.  
 
The first signs of a global recovery, in particular the reports 
of a modest growth rebound in the largest EU economies in 
the second half of 2003, bode very well for short- to medium-
term growth in the Accession Countries. Rising exports are 
likely to strengthen the gains in industrial production, further 
improve the financial situation of local companies, and 
improve the external balances that suffered in selected 
countries in the last several years. By no means, however, 
will the contribution from net exports become the key 
determinant of growth in the region. Although the negative 
contribution from net exports is likely to be reduced as 
exports rebound, growth in domestic demand will continue to 
play an increasingly dominant role. Even in countries where 
net exports have recently been strongly contributing to 
Chapter 1 

































growth, such as Slovakia, their role will gradually diminish in 
the next several years. Growth in the region will be mostly 
supported by a rebound in investment activity and steady 
expansion in private consumption. Another factor that will 
provide a boost to domestic demand will be wider access to 
EU regional and structural funds for the development of local 
infrastructure.  
 
Performance on inflation has been considerably more mixed 
since the summer months of 2003, with a wide variety of 
factors affecting price levels. As expected, bumper harvests 
and the unusual strength of local currencies that had put 
downward pressure on domestic prices in 2002 have not been 
repeated last year. As a result of drought conditions across the 
continent, grain harvests suffered, putting pressure on prices 
of key food products with increases continuing all throughout 
the reminder of last year. Although the fast conclusion of the 
war in Iraq provided some hope that the international prices 
for oil would drop more rapidly, in reality price levels hardly 
budged. Furthermore, two of the Acceding Countries, 
Slovakia and Hungary, embarked upon a major adjustment in 
VAT and excise tax rates, in order to make them compliant 
with EU requirements. These one-off adjustments pushed 
headline inflation up very rapidly, to as much as 10% y/y in 
Slovakia, and 8.0% y/y in Hungary. While core inflation 
remained under control, the impact of sharp increases in 
prices could have longer-lasting effects on inflationary 
expectations, providing for a much more challenging 
environment for monetary authorities. Furthermore, in the 
Hungarian case, inflation levels have continued to be 
influenced by rapid growth in real wages. 
 
Inflationary expectations across the region are also fuelled by 
uncertain situation of public finances in four Central 
European Acceding Countries —Poland, Hungary, the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia. Moreover, continued fiscal problems 
are also likely to delay the adoption of the euro by the major 
Acceding Countries possibly until 2010, five to six years after 
the EU accession, as the chances of bringing public sector 
deficit below 3.0% of GDP any time soon are becoming 
increasingly remote. Despite the proper diagnosis of the 
underlying problems (structural fiscal rigidities relating to 
bloated and inefficient social security systems and 
bureaucratic waste), the local governments show little resolve 
in tackling the problems they are facing.  Partially, this is 
caused by the election schedules, as ruling parties seeking re-
election are unlikely to undertake socially unpopular 
measures. But the foot-dragging on fiscal reform is also seen 
as a means of supporting the still weak economic recovery 
through additional fiscal spending.  In our Autumn report, we 
have indicated that the fiscal situation across the region was 
not very rosy. Unfortunately, the situation has deteriorated 
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even further since. 
 
The resurgence of, still muted, inflationary pressures, and the 
uncertainty about the fiscal situation, put the monetary 
authorities across the region on alert. Following rapid 
declines in policy interest rates in 2001 and 2003, the 
monetary authorities started 2003 on a considerably more 
cautious note and the situation has not changed since. Central 
banks in key countries were reluctant to ease monetary 
conditions to avoid having to hike rates later in the year.  
 
  Real GDP Growth Avg. CPI Inflation Unemployment rate
Public Sector 
Deficit 
  in % in % in % of labor force in % of GDP 
  2003  2004  2003  2004  2003  2004  2003  2004  
Cyprus 2,1  3,7  4,1  2,0  3,3  3,2  -6,0  -3,6  
Czech Republic 2,9  3,8  0,1  2,7  9,9  10,1  -12,9  -5,9  
Estonia 4,9  5,6  1,3  2,3  9,3  8,8  0,9  0,3  
Latvia 7,4  6,1  2,9  3,1  8,2  7,9  -2,8  -2,5  
Lithuania 8,3  6,1  -1,2  0,1  10,3  9,8  -1,5  -1,5  
Hungary 2,9  3,2  4,7  6,2  6,0  6,0  -5,9  -4,5  
Malta 1,3  3,6  0,5  2,2  5,3  5,1  -6,1  -5,5  
Poland 3,7  4,6  0,7  2,3  20,0  19,4  -4,9  -5,4  
Slovakia 4,2  4,6  8,6  7,5  15,2  14,7  -4,5  -5,7  
Slovenia 2,3  3,9  5,6  4,4  6,4  6,4  -1,9  -1,7  
 
Table 1.1 Macroeconomic outlook and forecasts for the Acceding Countries 
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This Chapter is an evaluation of time series methods for 
forecasting macroeconomic variables such as GDP 
growth, inflation and interest rates for the ten countries 
acceding to the European Union.  Forecasting of these 
indicators is an exercise of considerable importance 
given that key policy decisions will need to take account 
of the expected future evolution of these variables, as 
highlighted in the previous Chapter where judgemental 
forecasts partly based on structural models were 
discussed.  
 
Because of the period of transition, the difficulties in the 
forecasting exercise arise from the availability of only 
short spans (denoted T) of reliable time series and from 
the existence of structural breaks.  This suggests the 
adoption of simple time series models as forecasting 
tools, possibly robustified against breaks, because of 
their parsimonious specification and good performance. 
 
However, despite the constraints on the time span of the 
data, a large number of macroeconomic series of 
potential use in forecasting (for a given time span) are 
available for each country.  This makes the recently 
proposed dynamic factor models a viable and alternative 
forecasting tool, where the limitations on estimation and 
forecasting implied by the short length of time series are 
compensated by extending the longitudinal dimensional 
of the data (denoted N).   
 
Dynamic factor models have been successfully applied in 
a number of papers to forecasting macroeconomic 
variables for the US and the Euro area.  The primary 
justification for the use of factor models in large data sets 
(where N may exceed T) is their usefulness as a 
particularly efficient means of extracting information 
from a large number of data series, albeit of a short time 
span.  Forecasts of key macroeconomic variables may be 
significantly improved, not least because in a rapidly 
changing economy (subject to irregular shocks), 




















allow to remain 
“agnostic” 
about the 


























ranking of variables as good leading indicators or 
forecasting devices for, say, inflation or GDP growth, is 
not at all clear a priori.   
 
Thus, factor models provide a methodology that allows 
us to remain ‘agnostic’ about the structure of the 
economy, but to employ as much information as possible 
in the forecasting exercise.  They are also of importance 
since the methodology offers researchers better tools for 
the analysis of economic policy, for example by 
including forecasts from factor models in estimating 
Taylor-type rules. Moreover, policymakers operate in real 
time and in their decision-making process commonly use 
extensive information on economic activity, data from 
different sources, different frequencies and different 
vintages.  In this respect, factor models permit the 
incorporation of such heterogeneous information in the 
empirical analysis, thereby providing a clearly specified 
and statistically rigorous but economical framework for 
the use of multiple data sets. 
 
Annex 2 provides a comparison of the relative 
performance of the two formal forecasting approaches 
(time series models and dynamic factor models), first by 
means of simulation experiments and then using data 
from five acceding countries: the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. The results 
from the simulation exercise help to interpret the 
empirical forecasting exercise.  In particular, simulation 
results show that in sample sizes of quarterly data 
typically available for Acceding Countries, even when a 
factor model generates the data, AR forecasts can 
produce higher forecasting precision.  In practice, the 
costs of using a simple AR model are lower than the 
estimation costs associated with the large scale factor 
model.  This holds unless the factor-based forecasting 
model is very simple, just one or two factors, and the 
forecast horizon is short. 
 
In the empirical application we compare various 
specifications of factor models with simple AR and VAR 
models. The factor models differ according to the lag 
structure (inclusion of lagged endogenous variable, 
lagged factors our without both), model selection method 
(fixed model structure or selection with BIC criterion) 
and factor extraction (balanced or unbalanced panel). The 
main advantage of such an approach is that it considers a 
large number of different model specifications and thus 
provides extensive information on general forecasting 
performance of factor models compared to standard time-
series models and serves as a robustness check of our 
methodological approach. In addition, we consider 
intercept correction and second differencing as 








































Our baseline forecast comparison considers only country-
specific data. We use quarterly data for the period 1994 –
2002. The number of series range from 38 for Slovenia to 
60 for Hungary. The data sets broadly contain output 
variables (GDP components, industrial production and 
sales); labour market variables (employment, 
unemployment, wages); prices (consumer, producer); 
monetary aggregates; financial variables (interest rates, 
stock prices, exchange rates), balance-of-payments data 
and, where available, survey data. 
 
We also investigate how inclusion of Euro area data in 
forecasting models affects forecasting performance. Euro 
area information is used in three ways. First, Euro area 
variables are used as exogenous regressors in the AR 
forecasts. Second, in the factor models, the forecast for 
each country is constructed using Euro factors only, in 
the same way as the country-specific factors. Third, Euro 
factors are combined with country-specific factors. 
 
The results can be summarised as follows. A factor model 
yields the best forecasts for GDP growth for the largest 
countries, namely, the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Poland, while a VAR is best for Slovakia and Slovenia. 
For inflation, an AR model is the best performing for 
Hungary, while factor models are preferred for the other 
for countries. For the short term interest rate, factor 
models work best for the Czech Republic, Poland and 
Slovakia, an AR model with Euro area information for 
Hungary and Slovenia. 
 
Five other general results emerge from the analysis. 
First, in samples as short as ours it may be better to use a 
fixed model rather than selection using the BIC criterion. 
Second, adding an AR component to the factor model is 
usually beneficial.  Third, Euro area information has
minor predictive content. This finding is due to the 
declining synchronization of the Acceding countries with 
the Euro area because of the convergence process, as 
noted in the previous EFN Report. Fourth, pooled 
forecasts constructed by taking the average of the 
individual factor forecasts do not systematically beat the 
AR benchmark, in line with the simulation results 
presented in Annex 2. Finally, intercept corrections and 
second differencing (as forecast-robustifying devices 
against structural breaks) should be used with care 
because they yield forecasting gains only in few cases. 
 
To conclude, we argue that the results are supportive of a 






































macroeconomic variables for the Acceding Countries. 
The collection of better data sets prove valuable for 
policy makers, who by being constrained by the time 
dimension of data at their disposal, could benefit from 




The episodes of exchange rate and balance of payment crises during 
the 90s highlighted the danger of having too big current account 
deficits. Policymakers in many developing countries are faced with 
the problem of how to avoid too wide external imbalances and how 
to finance the existing ones, minimising the risk of sudden stops or 
reversals in the flow of foreign investment. Several dimensions of 
economic policy are concerned. First, demand management: 
policymakers can exert a (limited) control on the balance between 
saving and investment by adjusting budget deficits and promoting 
private saving. Second, the choice of the exchange rate regime 
plays an important part in how the economy reacts to shocks and 
how the external imbalances evolve. Third, on the financing side, 
economic policy must be focused on keeping the countries 
attractive for foreign investment, especially in the form of long term 
commitment such as FDI. At the same time structural reforms must 
be implemented in order to have a sound financial system able to 
manage international inflows, and to minimise the probability of 
banking crises. 
 
The issue of current account sustainability is particularly important 
for Acceding Countries in several respects. Most of these countries 
show big and in some cases, widening, deficits, originated by both a 
surge in investment and expansionary fiscal policies.  Moreover, 
after the entry into the EU these countries will try to join EMU. The 
transition to the single currency will have to be designed taking into 
account current account imbalances. In several of these countries 
external deficits are mostly financed by FDIs, but it is not at all 
granted that their size will be stable in the near future. The inflow of 
more risky investment will require developed and sound financial 
systems. 
 
A first step in analysing current account positions in Acceding 
Countries is to assess whether they are sustainable, i.e. if the 
continuation of the current government policy stance and private 
sector behaviour are going to entail an increase in foreign debt 
which would require a drastic policy shift (such as a fiscal 
contraction) or trigger a balance of payment or currency crisis. To 
this end we use a simple standard accounting methodology, which 
takes into account the projections of real GDP growth, real interest 
and exchange rate and the current level of external debt (assumed to 
be the optimal one) and considers the importance of FDI as a non 
debt-creating source of financing (see Annex 3 for details). Overall, 
assuming that in the medium term the FDI flows relative to GDP 
 
 Chapter 3 
The Sustainability of Current Accounts in 
Acceding Countries 
…and for Acceding 
Countries too, 
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will try to join the 
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will remain constant, all the countries considered, with the 
exception of Lithuania, have sustainable current account deficits, in 
the sense that, given the assumptions on growth and interest and 
exchange rates, debt is stabilised at the current level. However, if 
FDI are not considered, the sustainable level of imbalances appears 
much smaller than the observed ones. This underlines the 
importance of FDI in the financing of the deficit, and highlights the 
fact that attracting them should be one of the main priorities for 
economic policies in Acceding Countries. 
 
The next step of the analysis is an assessment of what drives the 
current account imbalances, in order to have a rough idea of their 
possible developments. We found that the budget deficit is strongly 
correlated with the external deficit: on average, a percentage point 
worsening in the budget balance leads to a 0.4 % deterioration in 
the current account. The increase in per capita income appears to be 
negatively correlated with the external balance. Higher income 
reduces individuals’ credit constraint and thereby savings, a result 
in line with previous analyses of developing countries. Financial 
deepening (measured as ratio of money to GDP) shows a positive 
correlation: a more sophisticated financial system might incentivate 
saving. However the overall effects of these variables are 
ambiguous: for example a more developed credit market may as 
well boost investment, leading to a deterioration in the current 
account. Finally, trade openness has a negative correlation with the 
current account. Higher openness indicates a higher ability to repay 
external debt, and therefore weaker external borrowing constraints. 
We use the result of the estimation in order to simulate the paths of 
current account until 2007. To this end we use a forecast for per 
capita GDP and the targets for budget deficit these countries spelled 
out in their Pre Accession Plans. Moreover we assume that for most 
of the countries trade openness is set to increase. Concerning 
financial deepening, the possible ambiguous effect it may have 
leads us to keep it constant for the forecasting period. The 
simulations indicate that current account deficits are set to widen 
considerably for all the countries, as the projected reduction in the 
budget deficit is not enough to compensate for the effects of the 
forecasted rapid growth in per capita income. On top of that, even 
assuming that FDI will remain at the same ratio to GDP observed in 
the last years, this would lead to a quick build up of foreign debt in 
most of the countries analysed, in contrast with the results obtained 
previously. 
The main implications of this simple simulation exercise are 
twofold. First of all, widening deficits and some debt build-up are a 
natural product of the transition process. Secondly, Acceding 
Countries have committed themselves to a quick reduction of the 
budget deficit. According to the simulations, these measures 
(provided that they are really implemented and yield the expected 
outcome) would not suffice to avoid a deterioration of the external 
imbalances.  
 
The conclusion for countries willing to join ERM II as soon as 















































possible is that, if the government is keen on targeting the current 
account by means of the fiscal policy only, it will be obliged to 
take much harsher measures, with possibly negative 
consequences on growth. 
 
A final note of caution is also imparted in relation to the 
interpretation of the business cycle evidence in the light of the 
countries’ short post-transition history and their heady 
development and ongoing structural change. 
 
The results raise two additional issues related to the financing of 
investment and to the adoption of the Euro. 
 
The saving rate 
Investment are going to be high in Acceding Countries for some 
time, as they still enjoy a much higher return on capital than 
existing EU member due to a lower capital stock. Therefore a 
high saving rate is needed in order to prevent dangerously high 
levels of external deficit.  Policymakers in these countries should 
therefore aim at increasing private savings (which is already at 
levels comparable to that of EU Countries) or make efforts to 
strengthen government one. Government saving would also act as 
a sort of buffer, providing insurance against external shocks 
affecting negatively the current account. A related question is the 
feasibility of a large fiscal tightening in these countries, as it may 
clash with real convergence targets for which a high level of 
public expenditure is often needed. 
 
Adoption of the Euro 
Acceding Countries will experience substantial external 
imbalances during their transition to the single currency. The 
choice of the exchange rate regime for the interim period should 
acknowledge the existence of the deficit and the related risks. 
 
Large capital inflows mirroring the current account deficit are 
largely a real phenomenon, which is independent of the exchange 
rate regime chosen. However, adopting fixed or flexible exchange 
rates exposes the countries to different kinds of risk. With a long 
lasting fixed exchange regime, agents might tend to borrow 
heavily in the foreign currency, making the costs of adjusting the 
exchange rate very high. Moreover, given the trend real 
appreciation due to the Balassa Samuelson effect, too early an 
adoption of the euro could lock the countries to a “wrong” 
exchange rate. 
 
On the contrary, a flexible exchange rate would act as a partial 
disincentive to have big foreign exchange open positions, making 
Transition is 
likely to widen 
the deficit and 
increase 















































the system as a whole less vulnerable. In this case, however, the 
mismatching of banks’ assets and liabilities can become sizeable, 
and big swings in the exchange rate can cause relevant problems 
of non performing loans. In this sense the quality of the financial 
system in Acceding Countries, has a critical importance, as 
discussed in the final Chapter of this Report. 
 
It has been argued that in order to have successful 
macroeconomic policies in developing countries, the 
development of good fiscal, financial and monetary institutions 
may be more important than the choice of the exchange rate 
regime. As shown by almost all the recent examples of exchange 
rate crisis, weak institutions amplify the effects of external 
shocks, as in the case of the banking crisis occurred in Asia in 
1997, or greatly reduces the possibility of the economic authority 
to react to external shocks. Recent surveys on the subject and the 
regular reports produced by the European Commission, show that 
the adequacy of financial institutions in Acceding Countries is 
still quite diverse, see also Chapter 5. 
 
A tentative conclusion is that countries still having flexible 
exchange rates should maintain them as long as convergence has 
(among other things) reduced the size of the deficit. This must be 
complemented by strong and credible commitments to keep 
inflation under control and to improve the financial institutions in 
order to have monetary policies transmitted to the real sector in 
the most powerful way, see the next Chapter on the latter point. 
Adopting a fixed exchange rate agreement and choosing the 
wrong parity would shift the burden of the adjustment to domestic 
demand, being devaluation impossible (in the case of euroisation) 
or extremely difficult or painful, in the case of pegged rate or 
currency board and given the strong degree of wage and price 
rigidity. The correction of imbalances would then entail a 
compression in demand or a marked reduction in nominal wages. 
 
On the other hand, for countries with various forms of fixed 
exchange rate arrangements, the shift to flexible exchange rates 
would be too costly in terms of turbulence in the financial system. 
Their economic authorities will have to put even more attention in 
checking current account imbalances, using demand policies, and 
at the same time guaranteeing that deficits are financed in a 
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Monetary Transmission in Acceding Countries 
The analysis of the monetary transmission mechanism tries to 
describe the channels through which monetary policy 
decisions are transmitted to the economy and affect policy 
objectives. Knowledge of the monetary transmission 
mechanism underpins effective conduct of monetary policy: 
It allows not only selection of an adequate set of policy 
instruments but also their implementation in a timely way. 
Two aspects are important in evaluating how monetary policy 
affects the real economy. First, the transmission from the 
instruments directly under the central bank’s control (i.e., 
short-term interest rates or reserve requirements) to those 
variables that most immediately affect conditions in the non-
financial sector (loan rates, deposit rates, asset prices and the 
exchange rate). Second, the link between financial conditions 
and the spending decisions of households and firms that will 
affect aggregate demand. 
 
In this Chapter, we focus on this second aspect of the 
monetary transmission in eight Acceding Countries: the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
the Slovak Republic and Slovenia. The analysis of the 
monetary transmission in these countries is especially 
relevant because after joining the European Union they will 
try to adopt the euro and enter the single monetary policy 
area. In fact, as more central banks in Acceding Countries 
move towards inflation control, a good knowledge of the 
transmission mechanism in their economies becomes crucial 
for implementing good policies. Moreover, in the context of 
the Monetary Union, “country” differences in terms of 
business cycle positions can also be related with differences 
in monetary transmission (Kieler and Saarenhimo, 1998). In 
fact, as Hughes, Hallet and Piscitelli (1999) point out, 
asymmetries in monetary transmission could destabilise the 
business cycle, and put countries out of phase with one 
another in a way that could not be corrected by deficit 
constrained fiscal policies. The effect would be to delay 
convergence.  
 


















monetary transmission mechanism in Acceding Countries does 
not contain much clear evidence. Most of the studies dealing 
with the first step of transmission find some links between 
market interest rates (the ones influenced or set by central 
banks) and commercial banks’ deposit and lending rates. 
However, these links are usually very weak. Given this weak 
first step of transmission, the studies generally do not find 
evidence of a significant second step of transmission between
monetary variables and inflation or GDP. 
 
One aspect that should be taken into account when analysing 
monetary transmission in Acceding Countries is their different 
exchange rate systems, as there is a clear link between the 
exchange rate regime and the way monetary policy affects the 
real economy. In fact, monetary policy has not been 
independent from the exchange rate system adopted. Those 
Acceding Countries that rely on fixed exchange rates, 
particularly on hard pegs like currency boards, have tied hands 
in monetary policy. On the other hand, those Acceding 
Countries that opted for floating exchange rate regimes, 
particularly free floaters with inflation targeting, retain 
independence in their monetary policies, with those countries 
relying on intermediate regimes, such as managed floating, 
somewhere in between. Moreover, and due to the continuous 
changes experienced by these economies, the analysis of the 
role of monetary policy and its transmission is not an easy task. 
As Gollinelli and Rovelli (2002) highlight, in official policy 
reports of some central banks during the past decade, one often 
encountered statements implying that “monetary aggregates 
behaved unpredictably”, “the relation between money and 
growth was unpredictable” or “changes in interest rates did not 
significantly affect in a negative way domestic demand”. In 
this context, it is not surprising that at the start of the transition 
period many Acceding Countries have not chosen to exercise 
an active, independent monetary policy and instead have 
adopted a fixed exchange rate policy. 
 
In fact, nowadays, the degree of monetary independence is 
clearly related with the exchange rate system but also with the 
level of capital controls in the considered economy. The 
following figure summarises the interactions between the 





Countries can be 
grouped into two 
main clusters: 
countries with 
(free or managed) 
floating exchange 























Figure 4.1: Exchange rate systems in the Acceding Countries, adapted from Dean (2003) 
 
 
Exchange rate stability 
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From Figure 4.1, two different groups of countries can be 
distinguished: 
 
• The first group includes the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia. The first three 
countries have adopted a direct inflation targeting 
approach to guide their monetary policy (although in 
Hungary more than one nominal anchor is considered). 
Poland has a free floating exchange rate system while the 
Czech Republic has a managed floating exchange rate 
system and Hungary has a fixed peg, but with ±15% 
bands. In these three countries, we should expect a high 
degree of autonomy for conducting their monetary policy. 
Regarding the Slovak Republic and Slovenia, both 
countries use the exchange rate as a nominal anchor for 
monetary policy and their exchange rate system is a 
managed floating. It is worth mentioning that, apart from 
the exchange rate, in Slovenia there is also a monetary 
aggregate target while in the Slovak Republik various 
indicators are also monitored in order to conduct the 
monetary policy. In both cases, the ability to use 
discretionary monetary policy would be similar, although 
a bit more limited, than in the previous case.  
 
• The second group corresponds to Estonia, Lithuania and 
Latvia. The first two countries have currency board 
arrangements, while Latvia adopted a fixed peg with the 

































Evidence is also 
in favour of a 
strong relevance 
of the interest 
rate channel… 
 
currency board was to obtain price stability by 
eliminating (the money-supply related) domestic sources 
of inflation. Under a currency board arrangement there is 
no active monetary policy. This means that exogenous 
changes in interest rates or money supply do not arise 
from monetary policy. In fact, once the currency board is 
in place, fluctuations in the nominal exchange rate 
become external shocks to which the system adjusts 
automatically. Something similar happens in Latvia, 
where the role of monetary policy is very limited. 
 
In order to analyse the role of monetary policy and the 
relevance of the different monetary transmission channels in 
these two groups of Acceding Countries, we use different 
VAR models trying to capture the different dynamics of 
output, prices, interest rates, money and the exchange rate. 
We have chosen this methodology because it allows us to 
place minimal restrictions on how monetary shocks affect the 
economy. In fact, it explicitly recognizes the simultaneity 
between monetary policy and macroeconomic developments 
(reaction function) as well as the dependence of economic 
variables on monetary policy. Moreover, using different 
specifications and identification strategies, it is possible to 
take into account their different exchange rate systems when 
analysing the monetary transmission process. Of course, other 
differences between countries such as the financial or the 
legal structure could play an important role in explaining 
differences in the transmission of monetary policy are not 
explicitly considered in this paper. However, it is worth 
mentioning that although the degree of financial development 
is surely relevant in the two steps of monetary transmission
(from policy variables to market interest rates, loans, etc. and 
from financial conditions to real activity), some authors have 
stressed that it would be more relevant for the first step than 
for the second (see, Cecchetti, 1999). Moreover, other authors 
such as Carlino and DeFina (1999) have found evidence that 
the effects of the banking system are clearly interrelated with 
other variables such as the average size of firms or the 
predominance of more interest-rate sensitive sectors such as 
manufacturing or building. 
 
The analysis of the impulse response functions of the VAR 
models (estimated using quarterly and monthly data from 
1993 to 2003) permits to conclude that monetary policy has 
been effective to fight inflation or to stabilize output in nearly 
all the considered Acceding Countries, although the results 
should be taken with some caution as the uncertainty around 
the estimated responses is substantial (probably, due to the 
short number of available observations). 
 
Following Morsink and Bayoumi (2001), and to evaluate the 
share of fluctuations in output and prices that are caused by 
different shocks, we have also calculated their variance 
decomposition at forecasts horizons of one through four 
 25
years, see Figure 4.2. A higher relative influence of each kind 
of shock could be interpreted as evidence of a higher 
relevance of the associated transmission channel: the interest 
rate channel or the exchange rate channel. The results show 
that the transmission of monetary policy operates through the 
interest rate channel combined, in some cases, with the 
exchange rate channel. 
 
Looking at individual countries results (see Annex 4 for 
details), in the Czech Republic, the response of GDP and 
prices is very low and, in the case of prices, is only negative 
eight quarters after the initial shock. The reactions of 
consumption and investment are very similar to the ones 
observed for overall GDP, and there is evidence of the 
relevance of both transmission channels: the interest rate 
channel and the exchange rate channel. 
 
In Hungary, the reaction of both real GDP and prices is faster 
than in the Euro area (only three or four quarters after the 
shock). However, the effects are not as persistent as in the 
Czech Republic. Contrary to previous results, we find that the 
most relevant transmission channel is the interest rate. 
 
For Poland, the observed responses are quite close to those 
for the Euro area, with the only exception that the response of 
real GDP is much faster. The only relevant transmission 
channel is the interest rate channel. 
 
In the Slovak Republic and Slovenia, there is clear evidence 
of an exchange rate channel, while it seems that the interest 
rate channel of monetary policy remains blocked. In this 
context, and given the critical importance of joining the Euro
area as soon as possible, the monetary authorities should 
pursue further de-indexation of the financial contracts and 
stand ready to use interest rates to defend the currency and 
fight against inflation. For example, Festi (2001) defends the 
use of open market policy instruments by the Slovenian 
central bank. In fact, he highlights that it can enable a 
permanent flow of money between commercial banks and the 
central bank that would permit to send signals to the money 
market. In fact, shifting to a balanced conduct of monetary 
policy that also relies on the interest rate channel in a de-
indexed economy environment would contribute to prepare 
the financial sector to the ECB policy-operating environment, 
where monetary policy is implemented and transmitted 
primarily through interest rates (Suardi, 2001), and only to a 
minor extent through the exchange rate (Angeloni et al., 
2003). 
 
In Estonia, the reaction of GDP and prices to a monetary 
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Figure 4.2 Variance decomposition of prices-two years after the shock.  
x: exchange rate; m: money; s: interest rate; s_ea: interest rate Euro area 
 
Figure 4.3 Response of prices to a monetary shock in Hungary (left) and Poland (right) 
 
small and they are short-lived. There is no clear evidence of the 
presence of a well-defined interest rate or exchange rate 
channel. 
 
The results for Latvia show a clear response of prices to a 
monetary shock but monetary policy does not seem to have 
clear effects on output. Regarding the transmission channels, it 
seems that monetary transmission in Latvia works through 
interest rate and credit channels (but not the exchange rate). 
 
In Lithuania, there are clear effects of monetary policy on 
output, but not so clear on prices. In fact, the response of prices 
is the opposite as expected, but probably not significantly 
different from zero. Regarding the transmission channels, the 
“direct” interest rate channel seems to have been effective 
during the considered period. 
 
As highlighted in the EFN 2003 Spring Report, an additional 
aspect that should be considered when analysing monetary 
policy in the context of Acceding Countries is the interaction 
with fiscal policy. As Ganev et al (2002) highlight, “during 
transition, the institutions which are important for the 
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effectiveness of monetary policy are underdeveloped by 
definition, while processes hampering monetary transmission 
(budget deficits, bad loans) may be very strong or even 
dominant at times. This environment may even force the 
monetary authority itself into inconsistent actions, decreasing
their effectiveness even further.” In order to analyse the role of 
the interactions between monetary and fiscal policy in monetary 
transmission, we have re-estimated the models for Hungary and 
Poland but introducing as an exogenous variable their fiscal 
deficit. From the analysis of the impulse response functions of 
prices to a monetary shock in these countries, see Figure 4.3, it 
seems clear that interactions between fiscal and monetary 
policy have negatively affected the efficiency of the second to 
fight inflation. In this sense, it is worth reminding that the 
independence of the central bank is necessary for conducting an 
effective monetary policy and, not only, because it is a legal 
pre-requisite to accede the Monetary Union, but also for 
economic reasons. 
 
Before concluding, there are some issues that should be taken 
into account when interpreting the previous results. First, and 
due in part to the short time period considered because of data 
availability, confidence bands around the estimates of the 
responses to the monetary policy shock are very high (probably, 
in some cases, differences across countries are likely to be not 
significant). Moreover, one of the problems with cross-country 
comparisons is that the size of the estimated monetary policy 
shocks differs across countries. Even if we imposed the same 
initial disturbance, the problem would not be solved, as we 
would have to assume that the estimated parameters of the 
model are invariant to the specification of the policy rule, and 
then the Lucas critique would apply. 
 
In any case, it seems that monetary policy can play an 
important role as a stabilization tool for these countries. For this 
reason, more attention should be paid to the analysis of the 
transmission channels using micro data on banks and firms. To 
our knowledge, the only study on this issue is Brada et al. 
(2003) for the Czech Republic. They investigate empirically the 
role of bank lending in the monetary transmission mechanism 
in the Czech Republic, using bank level data for 1994-2001. 
Their results show that changes in monetary policy indicators 
have counter intuitive results. In fact, in terms of the bank 
lending hypothesis, monetary policy does not appear to have a 
significant effect on the supply of bank loans. According to 
them, these findings suggest that Czech policymakers cannot 
influence aggregate demand through shifts in loan supply and, 
as a result, it seems that the bank-lending channel has a limited 
role in designing monetary policy strategies. This result clearly 
provides additional information to have a better knowledge of 
how monetary policy works. This kind of research should be 
extended to the rest of the Acceding Countries in a near future 
and the experience for current Euro Area members in the 
context of the Eurosystem Monetary Transmission Network 


















…due to the 
burden of non-
performing loans  
 
Following their accession to the European Union in May 2004, 
the ten new members will continue to undergo structural and 
institutional change. The EU has set a target date of 2007 for the 
accession of two additional countries in the region, Bulgaria and 
Romania. All of these countries have already made dramatic 
strides in improving the stability and efficiency of their banking 
sectors as well as in eliminating restrictions on capital flows. 
However, these processes are not complete and further progress 
along these lines, including such phenomena as increased 
competition in the banking sector and more substantial flows of 
short-term capital, in and of itself has the potential to increase the 
risks of instability in the banking sectors of the individual 
Acceding Countries. 
 
The banking sectors of certain countries have followed rather 
different paths in the transition of their banking sectors from 
collections of state undertakings that largely served to 
intermediate between the government budget and budget-
financed enterprises and institutions and collect household 
savings to groups of predominantly privately held banks 
functioning in competitive markets for financial services. In each 
of the cases, extensive restructuring of the banks was required 
due to the substantial burden of non-performing loans that 
threatened their viability as financially independent institutions. 
 
The paths chosen in restructuring by Poland, the Czech Republic 
and Romania have had considerable impact on the roles currently 
being played by the banking sectors in financial intermediation in 
the respective economies and provide us with a spectrum of 
experience to evaluate their readiness to access the European 
Union. 
 
At the outset of their transition from centrally planned to 
predominantly market-oriented economies, the Acceding 
Countries of Central and Eastern Europe shared the common 
problem that their banking sectors were characterized by a 
relatively small number of large, state-owned institutions that, 
due to political pressures and inappropriate incentives to 
management, had become burdened by large volumes of non-
Chapter 5 
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performing loans. These banks were therefore financially unviable 
as independent institutions without significant restructuring of 
their balance sheets. 
 
The Czech and Polish banking sectors, and to a somewhat lesser 
degree the Romanian banking sector, are now overwhelmingly in 
private hands. As of mid-2003, 83% of the authorized capital of 
the Polish banking sector was privately held, up from 51.1% at the 
end of 1995. In the Czech Republic, the state held a mere 4.1% of 
equity capital in the banking sector at the end of 2002, down from 
31.0% as late as the end of 1996. An initial privatization effort in 
1991-1993 as part of the mass voucher privatization program was 
subsequently followed in 2001-2002 by the privatization of state-
owned stakes in the largest banks with the participation of foreign 
strategic investors. Of Romania’s 31 banks (excluding branches of
foreign banks), only 3 remained controlled by the state in 2002. 
The majority privately-owned banks in the country held 59.6% of 
Romania’s total banking assets at the end of 2002, including 7.4% 
held by branches of foreign banks.  As of end-1994, Romania’s 
majority privately-owned banks had held a mere 19.6% of bank 
assets. 
 
The impact of increased competition in the financial services 
sectors has generally been to trim the number of banks after initial 
periods of expansion, through mergers or withdrawal of banking 
licenses. This process has tended to preserve a rather highly 
concentrated character in the banking sectors of the region. In the 
Czech Republic, there were 37 banks operating at the end of 2002, 
down from a peak of 55 in 1995-1996. In Poland, the number of 
banks peaked in 1997-1998 at 83 but fell to 59 by the end of 2002. 
In Romania, the number of banks grew through 1998, reaching 36, 
but was trimmed to 31 by the end of 2002. The market shares of 
the 5 largest banks in each of the countries in recent years testify 
to the high degree of concentration that has resulted  
 
The role of commercial banks in financial intermediation in 
Poland and Romania is much weaker than is typical for developed 
countries, largely thanks to the relatively short period that has 
intervened since the restructuring of the bank sectors.  
 
While international financial institutions have suggested that the 
volume of credit to the private sector as a share of GDP in 
economies at this stage of development should exceed 30%, in 
Romania in 2002 this ratio stood at only 8.4%. For Poland, the 
ratio remained in the neighbourhood of 18% through 2001 before 
falling slightly to 15.2% in 2002, reflecting the impact of tight 
monetary policy. While the ratio of domestic credit to the private 
sector to GDP in the Czech republic peaked at 54.3% in 1997, due 
partly to the recession that was setting in and an extended period 
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from IMF and 
World Bank 
it slid to only 24.3% by 2001 and further to 20.0% the following 
year. In sharp contrast, the comparable indicator for the aggregate 
of the 12 banking sectors of the EMU members rose from 103% in 
1997 to 116% of aggregate GDP in 2002. 
 
As for profitability of banking activity in these economies, in 
2000-2001, return on average assets for Czech banks was positive, 
but fell from 0.69% to 0.45%.  Return on average core equity fell 
from 14.99% to 9.99% in 2001. Polish banks were profitable 
throughout the 1996-2001 period, but rates of return declined 
monotonically thanks to increased competition in the market. Prior 
to restructuring, in Romania, rates of return were very low in 1998 
and negative in 1999. Return on average assets reached 3.1% in 
2001 and slipped to 2.6% in 2002 while return on average equity 
hit 21.8% in 2001 but declined to 18.3% in 2002.  
 
Improved bank regulation and supervision have been primary 
factors in shoring up the stability of the financial sectors of the 
economies in transition to date. Poor corporate governance and 
expectations of repeated government bailouts did not provide bank 
managements with appropriate incentives. In many cases, 
government officials used bureaucratic power to direct lending 
with soft repayment terms to financially troubled state enterprises. 
Auditing practices initially fell far short of international standards. 
Inadequate scrutiny in licensing new banks with insufficient 
capital to operate in an environment of lax supervision resulted in 
a rash of bank failures in some of the economies in the early post-
transition. Bank supervisory efforts suffered from lack of 
independence, resources and expertise. The result was the heavy 
burden on the bank sectors of significant shares of non-performing 
loans that served as a brake on economic recovery and growth due 
to inadequate financial intermediation. 
 
In the post-transition period, the Acceding countries benefited 
from the advice of the international financial institutions in regard 
to improving the stability of their financial sectors.  Joint working 
groups of the IMF and World Bank, under the Financial Stability 
Assessment Program, have conducted reviews of bank supervision 
in individual countries, measuring conformance with the 25 Basel 
Core Principles for Effective Bank Supervision established under 
the auspices of the Bank for International Settlements and have 
made recommendations where such conformance was incomplete. 
The working groups also conducted simulated stress tests for the 
individual bank sectors to determine if they would remain stable 
after suffering particular shocks.  
 
Accession to the European Union is likely to present the banking
systems of Central and Eastern Europe with the potential need to
cope with a new set of stresses. The banking systems will face
growing capital inflows together with possible change in exchange 
rate regimes as well as downward adjustment of interest rates in the
convergence toward Euro area rates. By the time of accession, all
constraints on capital account flows (with the potential exception
 31
of temporary restrictions permitted in extraordinary situations)
and barriers to foreign competition in the financial sector will
have been lifted. 
 
Substantial capital inflows, initially largely in the form of direct 
investment, will fuel growth in domestic investment and 
consumption, in turn widening current account deficits. To the 
extent that current account deficits would come to be financed to 
a significant extent with short-term debt, the potential for sudden, 
sharp reverse flow of capital is created if foreign investors come 
to change their sentiment about the country.  
 
While deposits in foreign currency declined as a share of total 
deposits as confidence in a fairly stable exchange rate increased, 
in the run-up to EMU accession, euro deposits may become 
increasingly popular. Sensitivity to interest rate differentials 
among local currency and euro deposits in domestic banks and 
between euro deposits at home and those held abroad could 
generate destabilizing capital flows. To the extent that banks’ 
balance sheets are asymmetric in terms of their assets and 
liabilities denominated in foreign currencies, sharp movements in 
exchange rates can have a substantial impact on their financial 
situation.  
 
Additionally, sharp exchange rate movements may also have 
serious consequences for the financial conditions of the banks’ 
major customers, their ability to repay loans denominated in 
foreign currency, and hence for the quality of the banks’ assets.    
 
It will continue to be necessary for bank supervisors to monitor 
banks’ open foreign currency positions and limit them if they 
threaten to create serious exchange rate risk to the balance sheets. 
It will also be necessary to monitor vulnerability to asset quality 
in the form of foreign currency lending to customers who might 
be unable to repay in case of unfavorable movements of the 
exchange rate. 
 
Acceding to the EU means opening the banking and financial 
services market wide to foreign competitors. Local banks will see 
net interest margins narrow and will seek to achieve greater 
efficiency by reducing the ratio of operating costs to assets, 
perhaps by growing assets rapidly through risky lending 
behaviour. Under this scenario, domestic banks may more rapidly 
approach a threatening proportion of troubled loans in their 
portfolios to the extent they have engaged in insider lending or 
implicit government-directed lending. Thus, it will be crucial to 
strengthen independence of supervisory agencies, enforce 
avoidance of conflict of interest and impose exposure limits, 
encourage the principles of good corporate governance, and 
improve standards for auditing. 
Additional details are provided in Annex 5. 
 
With Accession the 
banking systems 













































































Euro Area Outlook and Forecasts 
Economic outlook for 2004 and 2005 
After the weak performance of the Euro area economy in the 
first two quarters of 2003, activity picked up in the second half 
of the year. This was mainly due to a rebound of exports. 
Although the Euro appreciated against the Dollar and, to a 
lesser extent, against other major currencies, exports profited 
from the revival of the world economy. Consumption nearly 
stagnated and investment still declined. The modest 
performance of the domestic economy led to a subdued import 
growth. 
 
The recovery of the world economy is now well under way. 
Geopolitical tensions due to the Iraq war have eased, and the
terroristic attacks and the related higher costs for security do 
not threaten economic activity on a global scale. The ICT 
sector, three years after the new economy bubble burst, seems 
finally to have found promising new fields, in particular in 
consumer electronics. Monetary policy is very expansive with 
real short term interest rates now close to zero in the USA, in 
Japan and in the Euro area and there is no indication that they 
will be raised at any time in the coming months. 
 
The centres of this recovery are the US and Asia. In the US 
growth has accelerated throughout 2003. The strong stimuli
from low prime rates, expanding public expenditure and 
substantial tax reductions have already set a strong upswing in 
motion in the private sector. Growth is expected to be around 
4.6 percent in 2004. This acceleration is mainly driven by an 
increase in business investment. According to the February 
2004 report of Consensus Economics, forecasts for investment 
growth are about 10% on average. In contrast, consumption 
could prove to be the weak point, if households feel that the 
upswing will continue to side-step the labour market. In this 
case the saving rate, which is very low by historical as well as 
international standards, would likely rise. Indeed, up to now 
there are no clear signs of a significant expansion of 
employment in spite of the considerable expansion of output; 
this is due to the strong productivity growth of more than 4%. 
In our view, labour markets appear to be flexible enough to be 




The recovery of the 
world economy is 
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change to a more cautious spending behaviour of households 
might very well happen in the not too distant future, the risk of 
an abrupt decline in consumption in the forecasting horizon is 
low. In line with the Consensus view, we assume strong US 
GDP growth rates of 4.6% for 2004 and 3.7% in 2005. 
 
The second centre of economic growth is Asia: In 2003, strong 
growth in China led to a spectacular expansion of imports of 
around 40%. Japanese exporters profit from this development. 
This is one reason why Japan, after a decade of stagnation, 
appears to be returning to a growth path. The Japanese revival 
is not only driven by exports, but also by private investment, 
while the expansion of private consumption remains modest. 
The expanding Asian demand for industrial inputs is a main 
cause for the quite high oil prices and for the rise in many 
commodity prices since the autumn of 2003. The upswing in 
most Asian countries will continue in the forecasting period. 
Among these, China is becoming increasingly important for 
European exporters. By now, combined with Hong Kong, it is 
easily the third most important foreign destination for EU 
goods, after the US and Switzerland. 
 
The US, Japan, and the large countries of the European Union 
presently all run sizable public deficits. Therefore, fiscal 
consolidation will become a priority when the upswing is 
clearly under way at the end of 2004. This will contribute to a 
slightly lower evolution of world economy in the year to come. 
According to our forecasts, world trade will expand around 
8.2% in 2004 in 2005, after 4.2% in 2003. Downward risks, 
however, may stem from a reviving threat of terrorist attacks. 
 
The Euro area lags behind the cyclical upswing of world 
economy. Its economy performed poorly in the first two 
quarters of 2003, recording a technical recession. Mainly due to 
a rebound in exports, activity picked up in the second half of 
2003. However, private consumption expanded only at a slow 
rate, while investment continued to decline. Due to the weak 
performance of the domestic economy, import growth was 
rather low. 
The outlook will improve during the forecasting horizon, but 
overall performance is expected to remain rather modest. GDP 
growth is forecast at around 1.4% in 2004 and 2.0% in 2005, 
see table 6.1. Although quite low, the expansion of output will 
be higher than the growth rate of potential GDP: the evolution 
over the past 3 years has slowed down capital accumulation, 
and the NAIRU has stopped falling. As the weak investment 














…but the Euro 





The output gap 
will narrow only 
slowly and will 
still be 
significant at the 
end of 2005 
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  2001 2002 2003 2004: 1st half 2004: annual 2005: annual














GDP 1.6 0.9 0.4 1.1 1.4 1.4 1.8 2.0 2.7
1.6 1.5 1.0
Potential Output 2.5 2.4 1.9 1.9 2.4 1.9 2.5 1.7 2.4
0.3 0.6 1.0
Private Consumption 1.8 0.1 1.0 0.8 1.3 1.1 1.5 1.7 2.4
1.7 1.6 1.2Government 
Consumption 2.4 2.7 1.9 2.0 2.4 2.0 2.4 1.8 2.3
-1.3 -0.7 1.1
Fixed Capital Formation -0.1 -2.9 -1.2 0.2 1.7 1.0 2.7 3.5 5.7
2.6 3.3 4.8
Exports 3.3 1.7 0.0 3.9 5.1 4.8 6.3 7.2 9.3
2.2 3.2 5.3
Imports 1.7 0.1 1.5 3.6 5.0 4.7 6.2 7.6 10.0
8.6 8.6 8.3
Unemployment Rate 8.0 8.4 8.8 8.8 9.0 8.9 9.1 8.8 9.2
8.1 8.2 8.2
NAIRU 8.6 8.3 8.2 8.3 8.5 8.4 8.6 8.6 9.0
2.4 2.5 2.7
Labour Cost Index 3.3 3.4 2.9 2.6 2.8 2.7 3.0 3.1 3.5
-0.1 0.1 1.1
Labour Productivity 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.5 1.1 0.8 1.4 2.0 2.9
1.2 0.9 0.9
HICP 2.3 2.2 2.1 1.7 2.2 1.8 2.7 1.9 2.9
1.3 0.9 0.9







Percentage change in the average level compared with the same period a year earlier, except for unemployment rate and NAIRU that are expressed 




Year GDP growth Agriculture Industrial Construction Services Net taxes 
1999 2,82% 0,07% 0,22% 0,12% 2,11% 0,29% 
2000 3,49% -0,01% 0,87% 0,13% 2,60% -0,10% 
2001 1,59% -0,03% 0,10% -0,03% 1,72% -0,17% 
2002 0,87% 0,01% 0,05% -0,05% 0,88% -0,02% 
2003 0,43% -0,08% -0,01% -0,04% 0,55% 0,01% 
2004 1,40% 0,02% 0,25% 0,00% 1,15% -0,02% 
2005 2,00% 0,02% 0,37% -0,01% 1,57% 0,05% 



























































95% 80% 60% 40% 20% GDP growth
 
Percentage change over the previous quarter 
output growth still declines over the near future. 
Consequently, the output gap will narrow over the 
forecasting horizon: both the reduction in potential 
growth and the acceleration in actual growth account for 
this development. Nevertheless, the gap will be reduced 
only gradually from 2004.1 on. At the end of 2005, still a 
significant gap of 1.3% of potential GDP is predicted. 
Thus, no sizable inflationary pressure is expected from 
the demand side. The relative weak performance of the 
economy is also documented in the quarter-on-quarter 
GDP growth rates, see figure 6.1. From 2004 on, they are 
almost constant at the 0.5% level. Hence, an acceleration 

























































Although the global upswing will be reflected in a rebound of 
exports, the recent appreciation of the Euro will take its toll and 
will support import growth in 2004. Therefore, net exports will 
only slightly contribute to economic growth in 2004, see figure 
6.3. Since import growth is expected to be weakly stronger than 
export growth in 2005, their impact will even turn to be negative.
 













2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Domestic demand bright, net exports dark area. Percentage points; figures above the columns indicate 
overall GDP growth 
 
Both private consumption and investment are expected to pick up 
gradually over the forecasting horizon. Compared to recent 
upturns like 1998-2000, the dynamics remain weak, although 
financing conditions are favourable: real interest rates are at low 
levels, and stock prices have been rising since the trough in 
Spring 2003. However, expectations of households and firms are 
not overwhelmingly optimistic, see the indicator of economic 
sentiment in figure 6.4. While the observations in the period from 
September to November of 2003 are in the upper band of the 
forecast interval, the improvement has slowed down since then. 
Figure 6.4 Economic sentiment indicator, realized values and forecasts 











































Interval 70% (2004-02) Interval 70% (2003-08)
Date: March 17th, 2004  
Considering the different production sectors, table 6.2 shows that 
acceleration will be more pronounced on services, but without 
reaching the growth rates of 2001 in 2005. The recovery in 
industry will be modest and no growth is expected in 
construction. 
GDP growth will be 
mainly driven by 
the services sector 
 
Net exports will 
contribute only 














investment will pick 
up gradually, but 



























































One factor explaining the modest path of investment activity 
consists of non-optimistic sales prospects, as reflected by the 
evolution of the output gap. Since potential growth was above 
actual growth in the recent downturn period, stocks are likely 
to be high. Moreover, profit prospects of investors improve 
only gradually. Due to a recovery of productivity, real unit 
labour costs are roughly constant in 2004, and in 2005 a 
significant decline of roughly 1 percent is expected. However,
the previous cumulative increase of this measure was almost 
about 2 percent over the 2001-2003 period, see table 6.1.
Overall, investment projects will be undertaken not so much in 
order to meet rising demand, but to ensure competitiveness by 
adopting new technologies. Brighter profit prospects, the 
further improvement of financing conditions, and the better 
financial health of commercial banks will facilitate 
development. Tendencies for a gradual recovery in investment 
can be also seen in the survey indicators. The modest 
investment activity in the Euro area, however, might be 
accompanied by strong investments by European firms in 
emerging markets like the accession countries in the 
globalisation process. 
 
Private consumption will benefit from the improved confidence 
of households. Consumer price inflation in 2004 will be lower 
due to the appreciation of the Euro. This, however, will lead to 
lower wage inflation: wages move in line with prices and 
productivity, while the labour market situation plays only a 
minor role. Therefore real incomes will not benefit very much 
from appreciation. Moreover, weighty factors prevent a more 
favourable development of consumption: labour market
prospects will not conspicuously improve over the forecasting 
horizon. As GDP growth does not exceed productivity growth 
in 2005, employment will not significantly profit from the 
upswing. As a consequence, the unemployment rate is almost 
constant. Moreover, the increase in the labour force 
participation rate which was observed since 1995 will come to 
a halt. As potential output growth and the NAIRU are 
interrelated, the latter is expected to rise. Thus the 
unemployment gap shrinks and chances for a rise of 
employment without accelerating inflation are reduced. 
 
Moreover, problems of financing pay-as-you-go pension 
systems and public sector deficits in major Euro area countries 
will stay on the political agenda, and are strong reasons for 
cautious consumer behaviour. Social security reforms were 
also discussed in the past, but nowadays, the reforms are more 
fundamental, implying a higher degree of uncertainty of private 
households. 
 
Likewise, demand management by fiscal policy which appears 

















The rise in labour 
participation will 
come to a halt 
and 
unemployment 






































































to the comparatively weak position of public households in 
large member countries. This fact is true regardless of the 
question of whether fiscal policy is slightly contractive or 
expansive and to what extent the de facto suspension of the 
Stability and Growth Pact has damaged confidence in the 
soundness of fiscal policy.  
 
The strong positive stimulus from world trade on exports is 
jeopardized by the increase in the effective exchange rate of the 
Euro. Against the US Dollar the Euro has appreciated by about 
45% since February 2002, when the rise started. The main 
reason for this development appears to be the sceptical attitude 
of currency traders towards the sustainability of the large and 
widening current account deficit in the US. A weaker Dollar, it 
is argued, will help to reduce the deficit, at least in the medium 
term. Because the monetary authorities of important Asian 
countries like China peg their currencies to the Dollar or, as in
the case of Japan, slow down appreciation, a weak Dollar will 
largely imply a strong Euro. 
 
Upon closer inspection, however, Dollar pessimism does not 
rest on firm economic grounds. It is not convincing that the 
large US current account deficit of the last years has its main 
roots in an overvalued Dollar. In that case, the US economy 
would have performed poorly because of the lack of 
competitiveness of American products. The true picture is 
different: it is not the choice between products of different 
origins but the intertemporal decisions of US households, firms 
and the government to spend at present, that lead to large 
capital imports. The counterpart of these imports is the current 
account deficit. Therefore, a structural reduction of the deficit 
would only be caused by changes in intertemporal prices, i.e. 
interest rates, or by a change in the expectations about future 
incomes in the US. Such a change might be aided by a weaker 
Dollar, but that does not mean that the currency has to fall until 
the deficit has shrunk to some level considered as sustainable. 
According to the EFN forecast, the Dollar will be roughly 
stable around 1.20 Euro in 2004. Still, measured by purchasing 
power parities, the Euro appears to be overvalued relative to the 
Dollar. Therefore, we expect a depreciation of the Euro down to 
1.14 for 2005. 
 
However, exchange rate forecasts are notoriously unreliable. 
Thus, a further rapid appreciation of the Euro is not to be 
considered as a totally unlikely event. If it happened, the ECB 
might very well come under public pressure to counteract with 
Japanese style intervention. But, since an exchange rate related 
monetary policy is in danger of being affected by the high 
degree of instability in the currency markets, the ECB should 
not depart from its strategic focus on internal stability. The best 
provision against the pressure from appreciation would be to 
convince Asian monetary authorities of the merits of more 
flexible exchange rates. This would mean that the effects of 
Dollar volatility would be spread more evenly instead of falling 
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 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Capital 6.7 2.4 8.1 1.6 -1.5 0.1 3.8 3.1 
Durable 4.2 1.3 6.1 -2.1 -5.7 -4.9 1.1 0.0 
Intermediate 3.7 1.9 6.2 -0.5 0.0 0.5 2.5 2.0 
Non Durable 2.1 1.2 0.9 0.8 0.5 0.0 0.3 0.8 
Energy 1.6 0.8 1.9 1.4 1.0 3.0 -1.0 1.1 
Total EMU 3.8 1.8 5.2 0.4 -0.5 0.4 1.8 1.8 
Industrial production 
An analysis of the economic situation of the Euro area
economy also needs a short term perspective based on a 
quantitative monthly indicator. The Index of Industrial 
Production seems to be the best option for this purpose. Six 
new values have appeared since our last report, for August, 
September, October, November and December, 2003 and 
January, 2004. The observed values have confirmed the 
expected recovery, which has been a little better than 
forecast. While with data up to July it was expected that 
there would be a decrease in the average annual rate of 
growth of Industrial Production in 2003 of 0.1%, now a 
moderate recovery of 0.4% has been observed. Predictions 
for 2004 have also been revised up from 1.4 to 1.8%. The 
forecast for 2005 is also 1.8%. 
 
The average annual rates of growth for the different 
industrial sectors classified according to the destination of 
goods are in table 6.3. This table shows there is a recovery 
in Capital and Intermediate goods but the expectations for 
2004 and 2005 for their rates of growth are still below the 
average levels they registered from 1998 to 2000. A 
recovery in consumer goods has not taken place during 
2003, probably due to the effect of the exchange rate on 
exports, and this will be slow in 2004 and 2005 with values 
around 1 and 0% in Durable Consumer goods and around 0 
and 1% for Non Durable Consumer goods. 
 
The general economic sentiment indicator experienced an 
important recovery in the last months, but from a historical 
perspective it remains at rather low levels. 
 
Industrial production 
during the last six 
months experienced 
the recovery 







The recovery comes 
from sectors 
producing capital and 
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In last autumn’s report the inflation forecasts were 
constructed using information up to August, showing that 
inflation in the remaining months of 2003 would be just over 
2%, before slowing down during 2004 with an average 
annual rate of 1.8%. The six additional observations which 
are now available show that inflation from September to 
February has been close to our predictions. The forecasts for
the average annual rate in 2004 and 2005 are 1.8% and 1.9%, 
respectively, see figure 6.5. They incorporate higher 
international Brent prices and slightly higher forecasts for 
inflation in non-energy industrial goods.  
 
The monthly profile forecast for the year-on-year inflation 
rate during 2004 and 2005 shows some oscillations, with low 
values in February and March of 2004 and a subsequent 
recovery from April on. These low inflation values were also 
forecast in the previous report and the observed values for 
January and February can not be considered as a downward 
innovation on inflation which could even generate changes in 
monetary policy. A causal explanation of the inflation 
forecasts is provided in Annex 6. 
 
 
In the last six months 
inflation evolved in line 






The forecasts for 2004 














95% 80% 60% 40% 20% Forecast (Last Ob. Aug-03)
Confidence intervals at:
Historical Inflation mean 
(1995-2003) Source: Eurostat & IFL      Date: March 17, 2004  
 



























































Table 6.4 shows a comparison of the EFN forecasts for
the main macroeconomic aggregates with other forecasts, 
notably those of the European Commission, the IMF, the 
ECB, the OECD, and Consensus Economics Inc. 
To some extent, the comparison is biased because of the 
different information sets. For example, the EFN forecast 
is based on a dataset including the 4th quarter of 2003, 
which has only been available since March 2004. 
However, for both years of the forecasting horizon, the 
EFN outlook is more pessimistic, in particular regarding 
the development of private consumption. In our view, 
uncertainties in respect to working prospects and the 
financing of the social security system will lead to a 
comparatively weak performance of consumption and 
cause the saving rate to rise over the forecasting period. 
While consumption of private households is on a lower 
path than in other forecasts, our outlook for government 
consumption is higher. However, these issues are related, 
as government had behaved anti-cyclically in the past. 
Hence, if the outlook is more pessimistic, government 
consumption is likely to be stronger. Also, the restrictions 
of the Stability and Growth Pact appear to be less 
binding. 
All inflation forecasts show a nearly constant inflation 
rate in the years of the forecasting horizon. The EU, the 
ECB and the OECD forecast a slight decline, while our 
quarterly predictions point to an increase at the end of 
2005 because of some decline in the output gap. 
 
Table 6.4 Comparison of EFN forecast with alternative forecasts 
 EFN EU IMF ECB OECD Consensus
  2004 2005 2004 2005 2004 2005 2004 2005 2004 2005 2004 2005
GDP 1.4 2.0 1.8 2.3 1.9 na 1.6 2.4 1.8 2.5 1.7 2.1 
Private Consumption 1.1 1.7 1.6 2.0 1.9 na 1.6 2.2 1.7 2.4 1.4 2.0 
Gov. Consumption 2.0 1.8 1.3 1.4 1.4 na 1.1 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.5 1.2 
Fixed Capital Form. 1.0 3.5 2.4 3.0 3.1 na 1.7 3.9 2.3 3.9 2.1 3.3 
Unemployment rate 8.9 8.8 9.1 8.9 9.2 na na na 9.0 8.7 8.8 8.6 
HICP 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.7 1.6 na 1.8 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.7 1.6 
Industrial Production 1.8 1.8 na na na na na na na na 2.3 2.5 
EU: European Commission, European Economy, No. 5, 2003; IMF: World Economic Outlook, September 2003; 
ECB: ECB Monthly Bulletin, December 2003, OECD: OECD Economic Outlook, No. 74, December 2003; 
Consensus: Consensus Economics Inc., Consensus Forecasts, March 2004. IMF forecasts for demand 
components refer to the European Union. ECB figures correspond to their macroeconomic projections. Numbers 
in the table refer to the mean of the respective projected interval. 
Compared to other 
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Important variables indicating the state of the world economy are shown in the table below. For the 
US and Japan, an economic recovery is expected, in particular for 2004. This is reflected in an increase in 
GDP growth rates; while inflation will remain moderate. A roughly constant oil price of 30 US dollar per 
barrel is expected for the forecasting period. The Euro is predicted to depreciate slightly in 2005 against the 
US dollar and the Yen, in line with the international parity conditions. In particular, purchasing power parity 
holds as a long run relationship. 
Table 6.5  Variables of the world economy 
  2004 2005 
US GDP Growth Rate 4.6 3.7 
US Consumer Price Inflation 1.7 1.9 
US Short Term Interest Rate 1.2 1.8 
US Long Term Interest Rate 4.1 4.2 
Japan GDP Growth Rate 2.8 1.6 
Japan Consumer Price Inflation -0.2 -0.2 
Japan Short Term Interest Rate 0.1 0.1 
Japan Long Term Interest Rate 1.3 1.3 
World Trade 8.2 8.2 
Oil Price 30.0 30.0 
USD/Euro Exchange Rate 1.20 1.14 
100Yen/Euro Exchange Rate 1.21 1.13 
Apart from the development of world trade, long term interest rates and nominal exchange rates, all variables are 
exogenous to the EFN forecast, mostly taken from Consensus Economics. Oil price in US dollar per barrel, all other 







 BOX 6.2: THE STABILITY AND GROWTH PACT 
 
Towards the end of 2003 it became clear that the procedures envisaged in the Stability and Growth (SGP) for 
advising and ultimately, where necessary, sanctioning countries in breach of the 3% deficit ratio rule would not 
be enforced.  Two large countries – France and Germany – were reporting budget deficits in excess of 3% of 
GDP without the benefit of any of the “escape clauses” written into the SGP that would allow such excesses not 
to attract the commencement of the procedures, see tables 6.6 and 6.7.  The Commission’s advice to commence 
these procedures was not accepted by the ECOFIN (to test the legality of this, the Commission has launched a 
case against the ECOFIN’s decision).   
No immediate adverse impacts on the bond markets or the foreign exchange market were noticeable (if there 
were to be any they could easily have been discounted in advance); nor are any such effects incorporated into 
our forecast.  The mechanisms in our model which determine aggregate demand are broadly “Keynesian” and to 
the extent that the excessive French and German deficits indicate lower government saving than otherwise, they 
imply a support, welcome in itself, for aggregate demand and output in our forecast period.   
This by no means implies, of course, that countries should take their Treaty undertakings lightly when those 
undertakings conflict with an immediate national interest, nor does it mean that there would be no long-run 
consequences were the SGP to be completely abandoned. The construction of the Stability and Growth Pact is in 
certain respects a remarkable thing. There is no other parallel, to our knowledge, to a situation where a group of 
sovereign nations has come together to agree on a pact which will potentially constrain the freedom of fiscal 
action of the individual countries.  Viewed from this perspective it may not appear too surprising that the first 
attempt has not ended well.  What is important is that the lesson drawn is that a renewed pact will need a better 
design.  A lot has happened in the world since the SGP was first formulated, in terms of the attention that is now 
paid to the clarity and transparency of policy frameworks. It is true that the trail was blazed by monetary policy 
makers but there has also been progress in the fiscal sphere as well.  (The IMF’s Code of Good Practices on 
Fiscal Transparency is a good example of the principles that should be adopted, whilst the UK Government’s 
Code for Fiscal Stability is a good application of them). The Eurozone is a remarkable entity in combining a 
unitary monetary actor (the ECB) with a large set (12 at the moment) of independent fiscal authorities.  A Pact 
needs particularly to clarify the aims and scope of fiscal policy to make such a constitution work properly.  It 
also particularly needs to take care of the problem of the solvency of governments.  The original pact arguably 
placed most emphasis on the first of these requirements, providing a “rule-based co-ordination” of fiscal and 
monetary policy which gave the ECB full rein to assert and use its independence.  This aspect of the SGP has 
been recognized as an optimal arrangement by leading economists such as Alesina et al (2001). 
The pact does not contain a debt target other than the one implied by the promise in its preamble that 
governments will aim, in the medium term, for a position of balance or slight surplus.  This target implies long 
run debt positions of zero or even negative debt.  Because the Eurozone countries face in the medium run a 
problem of pension funding due to demographic developments, it might be sensible to aim for low debt positions 
now, in order to make room for a build up of debt later on. But this is the kind of thing that needs to be examined 
and spelt out.  Different countries are in different positions regarding their current debt levels and their likely 
future pensions problems.  On this basis it seems that a positive evolution of the provisions of the SGP might be 
one in which a deficit rule feeds back on a debt target as well as the output gap. (John Taylor (2002) has recently 
drawn attention to a fiscal equivalent of his famous rule for monetary policy). Such a rule would reflect the need 
to reduce debt levels at the same time as preserving a responsiveness to the cycle.  It has been fashionable to say 
that this responsiveness should be limited to the “built-in stabilizers”, although there are possibilities of a rule-
bound discretion being added to them (see Wren-Lewis 2002).  
Some people have drawn from monetary policy-makers another lesson, and that is to copy the device of the 
“monetary policy committee”, which being a committee of experts (not special interests) is able to guide 
decision-making with freedom from the political imperatives that often produce bad policy initiatives: three such 
suggestions that we know of are Wyplosz (2002), Fatas et al (2004) and Wren-Lewis(2002) .  It may seem 
unlikely that policy makers will go this far, but the call for the deployment of more disinterested expertise in the 
process of fiscal policy making is a strong one.  One aspect of the SGP that has been undeniably good is the 
pressure that it has supplied for surveillance and publication of forward plans.   
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Table 6.6: General government financial balances 
Surplus (+) or deficit (-) as a percentage of nominal GDP 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
         
Austria -3.8 -1.9 -2.4 -2.3 -1.5 0.3 -0.2 -1.1 
Belgium  -3.7 -2 -0.8 -0.4 0.2 0.6 0.1 -0.2 
Denmark -1 0.4 1.1 3.3 2.6 3.1 2.1 1.8 
Finland -3.2 -1.5 1.3 2.2 7.1 5.2 4.2 3.3 
France -4.1 -3 -2.7 -1.8 -1.4 -1.5 -3.1 -3.7 
Germany -3.4 -2.7 -2.2 -1.5 1.3 -2.8 -3.5 -3.4 
Greece  -7.4 -4 -2.4 -1.8 -1.9 -1.5 -1.2 -1.1 
Ireland -0.2 1.2 2.3 2.4 4.4 0.9 -0.2 -0.6 
Italy -7.1 -2.7 -2.8 -1.7 -0.6 -2.6 -2.3 -2.3 
Luxembourg 2 3.4 3.4 3.5 6.4 6.1 2.5 -0.2 
Netherlands  -1.8 -1.1 -0.8 0.7 2.2 -0.0 -1.6 -1.6 
Portugal -4 -2.7 -2.3 -2.8 -2.8 -4.2 -2.7 -3.5 
Spain -4.9 -3.2 -2.6 -1.2 -0.8 -0.3 0.1 -0.4 
Sweden -3.1 -1.6 2.1 1.5 3.4 4.5 1.3 0.8 
United Kingdom -4.4 -2.2 0.4 1.0 3.8 0.7 -1.5 -2.5 
Euro Area -4.3 -2.6 -2.2 -1.3 0.2 -1.6 -2.2 -2.5 
 
a Source: Broad Economic Policy Guidelines 2003, Table 77. 2001 -2003 updated from European Commission Forecasts. 
 
 
Table 6.7: Maastricht definition of general government gross public debt 
As a percentage of nominal income 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
         
Austria 69.2 64.7 63.9 64.9 63.5 67.3 67.3 68.5 
Belgium  130.1 124.7 119.3 115 109.3 108.5 105.8 102.7 
Denmark 65.1 61.2 55.6 52 46.8 45.4 45.5 42.7 
Finland 57.1 54.1 48.8 47.3 44 43.8 42.7 42.3 
France 57 59.3 59.5 58.6 57.5 56.8 59.0 61.8 
Germany 59.8 61 60.9 61.3 60.3 59.5 60.8 62.7 
Greece  111.3 108.2 105 104 102.7 107 104.7 101 
Ireland 74.2 65.1 54.8 49.3 38.6 36.8 32.2 33.3 
Italy 122.1 120.2 116.4 114.6 110.5 109.5 106.7 106 
Luxembourg 6.2 6 6.2 5.9 5.3 5.6 5.7 4.1 
Netherlands 75.2 69.9 66.8 63.1 56.1 52.8 52.4 52.4 
Portugal 62.8 59.1 55.4 55.1 54.2 55.6 58.1 59.4 
Spain 68.1 66.6 64.5 63.1 55.6 56.9 53.8 52.5 
Sweden 76 73.1 70.5 65.3 55.6 54.4 52.7 50.9 
United Kingdom 52.3 50.8 47.6 45.1 42.1 38.9 38.5 39 
 
a Source: Broad Economic Policy Guidelines 2003, Table 77. 2001 -2003 updated from European Commission Forecasts. 
 
